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The Impact of Federal Labor Policy on the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: 
Collective Bargaining Agreements in a 
New Era of Civil Rights 
Nearly thirty years have passed since Dr. Martin Luther 
King dreamed of an America where people would "not be 
judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their 
character."' When Dr. King delivered these famous words, 
Congress had already taken a major step toward making this 
dream a reality when it enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which bars discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.' However, because nei- 
ther Title VII nor subsequent federal civil rights legislation ad- 
dressed private sector discrimination against the disabled: 
Americans with disabilities continued to endure unconscionable 
employment dis~rimination.~ The passage of the Americans 
1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ennobles the Civil Rights Movement at the Lincoln 
Memorial, in LEND M E  YOUR EARS: GREAT SPEECHES IN HISTORY 499 (William 
Safue comp., 1992). 
2. 42 U.S.C. 82000e-2 (1988). 
3. Prior to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Congress passed two 
important laws designed to foster the rights of the disabled, but neither law ad- 
dressed private sector employment discrimination. The first of these laws, the Re- 
habilitation Act of 1973, was aimed at discrimination against the disabled within 
programs funded by the federal government. It provides that "[lo . . . handicapped 
individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, . . . be subjected to discrim- 
ination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 
U.S.C. 8 794 (1988). Second, the Education of the Handicapped Act, extensively 
amended by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 
$$ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. 111 1991), was enacted to ensure that "all handicapped 
children have available to them . . . a free appropriate public education which 
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique 
needs." 20 U.S.C. 8 1400(c) (Supp. 111 1991). 
4. Speaking of the effect that exclusionary attitudes have on disabled Ameri- 
cans, one writer noted: 
"At the least you might conclude that there is something queer about 
you, something ugly or foolish or shameful. In the extreme, you might 
feel as though you don't exist, in any meaningfkl social sense at all. Ev- 
eryone else is 'there,' sucking breath mints and splashing on cologne and 
swigging wine coolers. You're 'not there.' And if not there, nowhere." 
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with Disabilities Act (ADA or "the Act")5 in 1990 signaled the 
recognition of such discrimination and the beginning of a new 
era of employment equality for the disabled. Borrowing from 
Dr. King's language, one individual stated that  the "'ADA's 
vision is of an America where persons are judged by their abili- 
ties and not on the basis of their disabilities.' "6 
Even though the ADA is designed to foster equal employ- 
ment opportunity for the disabled, it appears to conflict with 
other federal legislation designed to strengthen the position of 
employees v i s - h i s  their employers through the process of col- 
lective bargaining. This comment examines these conflicts and 
proposes that, in spite of apparent inconsistencies between 
federal labor laws and the ADA, neither supersedes the other 
and both are necessary to promote and protect the civil rights 
Rosalie K. Murphy, Note, Reasonable Accommodation and Employment Discrimim- 
tion Under Title I of The Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1607, 
1611-12 (1991) (quoting Nancy Mairs, Hers, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1987, at  C2). 
Murphy notes that, if disabled Americans are "not there" in social circles, they 
are even less "there" in the workforce; statistical evidence indicates that employ- 
ment opportunities for the disabled are rapidly diminishing. Id. at  1612. For ex- 
ample, a recent Census Bureau report found that people with disabilities are less 
likely to hold jobs now than they were a decade earlier, and those who do work 
have actually lost earning power. Id. (citing Study on Disabled and Jobs Finds 
Work and Good Pay Are Scarce, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1989, a t  A.22). In addition, 
the percentage of disabled men who work full time dropped from 29.8% in 1981 to 
23.4% in 1988. Id. 
Yet even the force of these statistics pales in comparison to the personal life 
stories of disabled Americans who have suffered employment discrimination. At one 
of the congressional hearings on the ADA, a blind attorney who had graduated Phi 
Beta Kappa from the University of Pennsylvania and attended Harvard Law School 
testified that while applying for a job as corporate counsel, he was rejected over 
600 times before a corporation offered him employment. Id. (citing Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor 
and Human Resources, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1989) (statement of Joseph 
Danowsky, Attorney, Bear Stearns & Company)). 
Another attorney, confined to a wheelchair because of multiple sclerosis, expe- 
rienced similar difficulties. Despite having graduated near the top of her law school 
class at the University of Washington, and despite her law review experience, moot 
court success, and clerkships with a federal appellate court and a renowned intel- 
lectual property firm, she was rejected over 400 times before she was hired by a 
firm that "was willing to look at  [her] qualifications and not just [her] disability." 
Id. (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the House Subcomm. on Civil and Constztu- 
tional Rights, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1989) (statement of Laura D. Cooper, 
Attorney, Pettit & Martin)). 
5. 42 U.S.C. $9 12101-12213 (Supp. I1 1990). 
6. Murphy, supra note 4, at 1613 (citing H.R. REP. No. 485(II), lOlst Cong., 
2d Sess. 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 330 (statement of Sandy 
Parrino). 
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of the disabled. Part I1 provides an overview of Title I of the 
ADA, focusing on the duty it imposes on employers to make 
"reasonable accommodations" for disabled employees. Part  I11 
discusses the potential conflicts between the ADA and the Na- 
tional Labor Relations Act.' Part IV undertakes a similar anal- 
ysis of the relationship between the ADA and the Railway La- 
bor Act.' Finally, Part V reviews the specific issue of reassign- 
ment and shows how the federal labor policy promoting collec- 
tive bargaining interacts with ADA requirements. 
This comment concludes by suggesting that both federal 
labor laws and the ADA have positive roles to play in eliminat- 
ing employment discrimination against the disabled. The ADA, 
by recognizing the validity of collective bargaining agreements 
and their importance in resolving employment disputes, en- 
courages the continued use of the collective bargaining process 
and arbitration to protect disabled employees from discrimina- 
tion. Federal labor laws do not contradict the ADA because, 
while they certainly are capable of addressing the grievances of 
individual employees, the laws are primarily concerned with 
protecting the right of employees to speak collectively. The 
ADA, on the other hand, is civil rights legislation specifically 
designed to provide individual remedies for employees. While a 
disabled employee may be able to obtain redress through ap- 
propriate arbitration proceedings, he must be able to obtain 
relief in federal court under the ADA when his rights are not 
protected under the collective bargaining agreement. 
11. TITLE 1 OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
A comprehensive and sweeping statute, the ADA is com- 
posed of several different sections, each of which was enacted 
to eradicate a particular form of discrimination against the 
d i~abled .~  All of the sections are significant, but the core of the 
Act is Title I, which prohibits all forms of employment discrimi- 
nation. lo Pervasive discriminatory practices against disabled 
employees and job applicants are well documented;" the pur- 
7. 29 U.S.C. $$ 151-169 (1988). 
8. 45 U.S.C. $5 151-188 (1988). 
9. Title I, 42 U.S.C. $5 12111-12117 (Supp. I1 1990), prohibits employment 
discrimination; Title 11, $8 12131-12165, requires greater accessibility to public 
transportation; and Title 111, $5 12181-12189, bans discrimination by private enti- 
ties in places of public accommodation. 
lo. 42 U.S.C. $8 12111-12117 (supp. n 1990). 
11. See supra note 4; see also Lisa A. Lavelle, Note, The. Duty to Accommodate: 
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pose of Title I is to ensure the elimination of such practices by 
imposing affirmative duties on employers.12 The ADA requires 
every employer covered under the Act13 to engage in a three- 
step inquiry regarding its treatment of a disabled individual. 
Each employer must determine (1) whether the applicant or 
employee is a qualified individual with a disability,14 (2) 
whether the applicant or employee is capable of performing the 
job's essential functions,15 and (3) whether the employer is 
required to make a reasonable accommodation.16 
A. Is the Applicant or Employee a Qualified 
Individual with a Disability? 
When making any type of employment decision, the em- 
ployer must first determine if the particular applicant or em- 
ployee is a qualified individual with a disability.'' According 
to the Act's definitions, "[tlhe term 'qualified individual with a 
disability' means an  individual with a disability who, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that such individual holds 
or desires."lg A disabled individual meets one part of the 
Will Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals with 
Disabilities Only to Disable Small Businesses?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1135, 1136 
(1991). 
12. Lavelle, supra note 11, at  1193. 
13. As defined by the Act, the term "employer" means 
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more 
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in 
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person, 
except that, for two years following the effective date of this subchapter, 
an employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce 
who has 25 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of 
such person. 
42 U.S.C. $ 12111(5)(A) (Supp. 11 1990). Excluded from the definition of "employer* 
are the United States, corporations wholly owned by the United States government, 
Indian tribes, and bona fide private membership clubs (other than labor organiza- 
tions) that are exempt from taxation. Id. $ 12111(5)(B). 
14. See 42 U.S.C. $$ 12111(8), 12112(a) (Supp. 11 1990); 29 C:F.R. $ 1630.2(m) 
(1992). 
15. See 42 U.S.C. 8 12111(8) (Supp. I1 1990); 29 C.F.R. $ 1630.2(m)-(n) (1992). 
16. 42 U.S.C. $ 12111(9) (Supp. 11 1990); 29 C.F.R. $ 1630.2(0) (1992). 
17. "Disability," with respect to an individual, is defined under the Ad's regu- 
lations as "(1) [a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) [a] record of such impair- 
ment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment." 29 C.F.R. $ 1630.2(g) 
(1992). 
18. 42 U.S.C. $ 12111(8) (Supp. 11 1990). 
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"qualified" requirement if he "satisfies the requisite skill, expe- 
rience, education and other job-related requirements of the 
employment position [he] holds or  desire^."'^ Yet in order to 
fully "qualify," a disabled person must also be capable of per- 
forming the "essential functions" of the position, with or with- 
out reasonable accornm~dation.~~ 
B. Is the Applicant or Employee Capable of 
Performing the Job's Essential Functions? 
Employers only have duties to accommodate disabled per- 
sons who can perform a job's "essential functions," defined in  
the Act's regulations as "[tlhe fundamental job duties of the 
employment position the individual with a disability holds or 
desires."" This prerequisite is a key provision of the Act, be- 
cause i t  is here that one sees for the first time interaction be- 
tween federal labor policy and the ADA. 
The Act itself does not clearly define what determines 
whether a certain job function is "essential"; it  states only that  
[flor the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be 
given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job 
are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written de- 
scription before advertising or interviewing applicants for the 
job, this description shall be considered evidence of the es- 
sential functions of the job.22 
The regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Oppor- 
tunity Commission (EEOC), however, make it clear that evi- 
dence of whether a particular job function is essential may 
include much more than simply the employer's judgment. The 
evidence may include, among other things, "[tlhe terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement."23 By including collective bar- 
gaining agreements as evidence to be considered, the ADA's 
provisions concerning essential job functions will be construed 
not only with the employer's, but also with the employees', 
judgment in mind.24 
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1992). 
20. Id. The regulations also offer guidance on interpreting "reasonable accommo- 
dation," noting that "[a111 employer or other covered entity is not required to reallo- 
cate essential functions." Id. app. $ 1630.2(0). 
21. Id. § 1630.2(n). 
22. 42 U.S.C. g 1mi (8 )  (supp. n 1990). 
23. 29 C.F.R. 5 1630.2(n)(3)(v) (1992). 
24. See infia notes 66-73 and accompanying text. 
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C. Is the Employer Required to Make a 
Reasonable Accommodation? 
Upon making a determination that an applicant or employ- 
ee is a qua15ed employee with a disability who can perform 
the job's essential functions, an employer is generally required 
under the Act to make "reasonable accommodations" for the 
disabled person's known di~abi l i t ies .~~ As defined by the ADA, 
the term "reasonable accommodation" may include 
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily acces- 
sible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and 
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification 
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifica- 
tions of examinations, training materials or policies, the pro- 
vision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar 
accommodations for individuals with di~abi l i t ies .~~ 
However, there are exceptions to this general requirement. An 
employer does not have to make a reasonable accommodation 
for a disabled applicant or employee if the employer can prove 
that doing so would cause "undue hard~hip, '"~ defined by the 
Act as any "action requiring significant difficulty or ex- 
pense?' Again, the Act itself provides only minimal guidance 
as to what factors should be considered in determining whether 
a particular accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
on an employer. The four factors it lists focus mainly on the 
relationship between the cost of the proposed accommodation 
and the financial resources of the employer.2g 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12112@)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990). 
26. Id. § 12111(9). 
27. Id. 8 12112@)(5)(A). 
28. Id. § 12111(10). 
29. The Act states that factors to be considered include 
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; 
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in 
the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons 
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the 
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facili- 
ty; 
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size 
of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its 
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and 
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including 
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; 
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On the other hand, EEOC regulations are more illustrative 
and, as with determinations of "essential functions," are defer- 
ential to established federal labor policy. Noting that a demon- 
stration of undue hardship under the ADA requires a stronger 
showing of difficulty or expense than that required to satisfy 
the "de minimis" Title VII standard of undue hardship, the 
interpretive guidance appendix to the regulations stipulates 
that cost alone may not be deter~ninative.~' 
However, the regulations significantly expand the factors 
upon which an employer might rely to cogently defend its deci- 
sion not to make a reasonable accommodation; these factors 
include the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.31 
The interpretive guidelines to the regulations state: 
Excessive cost is only one of several possible bases upon 
which an employer could demonstrate undue hardship. Alter- 
natively, for example, an employer could demonstrate that the 
provision of a particular accommodation would be unduly 
disruptive to its other employees or to the functioning of its 
business. The terms of a collective bargaining agreement may 
be relevant to this deter~nination.~~ 
This express recognition of the status of collective bargain- 
ing agreements suggests that the ADA is meant to dovetail 
with, rather than undercut, several established federal labor 
acts designed to strengthen the collective rights of all employ- 
ees, not only those who are disabled. The following sections ad- 
dress notions of preemption and discuss how federal labor poli- 
cy and the ADA mutually support the right of all disabled per- 
sons to be free from employment discrimination. 
111. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ADA AND 
THE NATIONAL ~ B O R  ELATIONS ACT 
The preeminent federal law governing relationships be- 
tween employers and employees is the National Labor Rela- 
tions Act (NLRA).33 Enacted in 1935, one of the NLRA's pur- 
the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the 
facility or facilities in question to the covered entity. 
Id. 
30. 29 C.F.R. app. $ 1630.15(d) (1992). 
3 1. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. 29 U.S.C. $9 151-169 (1988). 
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poses is to "remov[e] certain recognized sources of industrial 
strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the 
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differ- 
ences as to wages, hours, or other working  condition^."^^ By 
promoting the two important practices of collective bargain- 
i ng5  and arbitration,s6 the NLRA intends to protect "the ex- 
ercise by workers. of full freedom of association, self-organiza- 
tion, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, 
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their 
employment or other mutual aid or prote~tion."~' The NLRA 
and the federal labor policy it embodies must be considered 
when interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
A. NLRA Collective Bargaining and the ADA 
Concern has been expressed that the ADA may undermine 
collective bargaining procedures established by the NLRAS8 
Yet the ADA, while it appears to pose several potential con- 
flicts with the NLRA, actually works in tandem with the 
NLRA's collective bargaining procedures. 
1. The right to exclusive representation 
One of the apparent conflicts between the ADA and the 
NLRA involves the right of unions to be the exclusive represen- 
tative of bargaining unit employees.3g Section 9 of the NLRA 
states: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of 
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a 
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur- 
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wag- 
es, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: 
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employ- 
ees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to 
34. Id. $ 151. 
35. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text. 
36. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
37. 29 U.S.C. $ 151 (1988). 
38. Jules L. Smith, Americans with Disabilities Act: The New Regulations and 
Critical Issues 35 (paper presented at a ~ u a l  meeting of the American Bar Associ- 
ation Section of Labor & Employment Law, Atlanta, Georgia (Aug. 12-13, 1991)) 
(unpublished manuscript, available from Jules L. Smith, Blitman & King, Roches- 
ter, New York). 
39. Id. at 36-40. 
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their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without 
the intervention of the bargaining representative, as  long as  
the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collec- 
tive-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided 
further, That the bargaining representative has been given 
opportunity to be present a t  such adjustment." 
As one commentator pointed out, this provision appears to be 
directly contrary to the ADA regulations promulgated by the 
EEOC, which allow for one-on-one discussions between the 
disabled person and the employer.41 These regulations state: 
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation i t  
may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an infor- 
mal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a 
disability in need of the accommodation. This process should 
identify the precise limitations resulting fiom the disability 
and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome 
those  limitation^.^^ 
Attempting t o  comply with both section 9 of the NLRA and 
the ADA regulations may place both unions and employers in a 
quandary.43 If an employer conducts an  "informal, interactive 
process" with a disabled individual to determine a suitable 
reasonable accommodation, the employer disregards its duty 
under the NLRA to bargain exclusively with the union repre- 
sentatives of its employees." The employer might try to re- 
solve this conflict by inviting the union representative to be 
present a t  the "informal'' discussion it conducts with the dis- 
abled person pursuant to the ADA. However, the presence of 
the union representative may in turn violate confidentiality 
provisions of the ADA.45 Nonetheless, these apparent conflicts 
do not undermine either the purposes or the effective enforce- 
ment of the two acts. 
a.  Exclusivity and the principle of majority rule. I t  can 
certainly be argued that the primary purpose of the NLRA is to 
strengthen the institutional foundation of unions. Under this 
view, the NLRA favors unions in order to remedy the inequali- 
40. 29 U.S.C. $ 159(a) (1988). 
41. Smith, supra note 38, at 40. 
42. 29 C.F.R. $ 1630.2(0)(3) (1992). 
43. Smith, supra note 38, at 39. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 40. 
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ty of bargaining power between employees and  employer^.^" 
As one commentator noted, the NLRA "not only protects the 
voluntary associations of workers but serves to empower 
them."47 
A contrary view is that the NLRA was not designed to 
favor one side over another but "to foster in a neutral manner" 
a system that would resolve the conflicting interests of manage- 
ment and labor.48 In other words, while unionization under 
the NLRA appears designed to protect workers from the arbi- 
trary and demeaning actions of employers, it is not clear 
whether the benefits of collective organization were designed to 
be mandatory or v~luntary. '~ Thus, it is reasonable to suggest 
that the NLRA is concerned a t  least as much with the interests 
of individual employees as it is with the institutional power of 
unions.50 
46. See 29 U.S.C. 8 151 (1988) (recognizing "the inequality of bargaining power 
between employees who do not possess hll freedom of association or actual liberty 
of contract, and employers"); see also Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1017 (4th 
Cir. 1983) ("A principal purpose of the labor laws is to 'redress the perceived im- 
balance of economic power between labor and management . . . .' " (citation omit- 
ted)); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The Wagner 
Act was of course intended to promote unionization."); Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 
362 F.2d 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) ("The National Labor Relations Act . . . was 
designed to overcome the inequality of bargaining power between employees and 
employers."). 
One commentator explained that the employer's duty to bargain under NLRA 
§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988), coupled with the rule forbidding employers from 
unilaterally instituting changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining without first 
bargaining with the union, see NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 
(1964), 5 s  a significant expression of an obligation to regard the union as having 
I some unspecified authority in the premises and thus amounts to a partial transfer 
to the union of what was once an unrestricted authority." Charles Fried, Individual 
and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor 
Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1026 (1984). 
47. Fried, supm note 46, at  1023. 
48. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 680-81 (1981). 
49. Fried, supm note 46, at  1027. See also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 
841, 845 (1992) ("By its plain terms, . . . the NLRA confers rights only on employ- 
ees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers."); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
NLRB, 592 F.2d 595, 602 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[Tlhe [NLRA] was not passed to encour- 
age pro-union activity . . . .3. 
50. See, e.g., NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 
1162, 1163 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The Act's provisions were designed to permit workers 
to exercise freely the right to join unions, to  be active or passive members, or to 
abstain from joining any union at all without imperiling their right to a liveli- 
hood."); NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Prod., 403 F.2d 702, 704 (5th Cir. 1968) ("The 
' Act 'was passed for the primary benefit of the employees as distinguished from the 
primary benefit to labor unions . . . . ' " (citation omitted)). 
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Indeed, the NLRA protects not only the employees' right t o  
freely associate for purposes of self-organization, but also their 
right to disas~ociate.~' In addition to having the right to re- 
frain from participation in labor organizations and concerted 
activity,52 many employees also have the right to refuse union 
membership under state right-to-work laws permitted by the 
NLRA.53 
Consequently, many employees do not desire, nor are they 
required, to be exclusively represented by a labor organization 
in their dealings with management.54 Considering the unique 
51. Section 7 of the NLRA provides: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also 
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the 
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring mem- 
bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as autho- 
rized in section 158(a)(3). 
29 U.S.C. $ 157 (1988) (emphasis added). 
52. Id. 
53. "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution 
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a 
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or ap- 
plication is prohibited by State or Territorial law." 29 U.S.C. $ 164 (1988). 
Today, 21 states have right-to-work laws that are permissible under the section 
cited above. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 1117 
(11th ed. 1991). These laws basically provide that employees are not required to 
join a union as a condition of receiving or retaining a job. Id. Labor organizations 
have campaigned heavily to overturn the laws, primarily on the grounds that since 
unions must represent both members and non-members, those who do not join are 
"free riders," receiving benefits without cost. Id. at 1119. 
On the other hand, employers are strongly in favor of right-to-work laws; they 
emphasize " 'the basic rights of an  individual to get and keep a job without having 
to pay tribute to any organization in order to make a living.' " Id. at  1120 (citation 
omitted). Moreover, employers stress that many employees desire to refrain from 
joining a union or paying dues for valid reasons of conscience. Id. 
54. Once a union has been certified or has established a majority status, the 
exclusive representation rule becomes operational and a worker has no choice but 
to be represented by the union. Fried, supra note 46, at  1028 (citing J.I. Case Co. 
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-39 (1944)). While the employee may not be forced to 
join the union (even though he may be required to pay union dues), he will still 
be bound by the result of union bargaining. Id. However, even in this situation it 
is conceivable that a disabled employee could meet privately with the employer 
without a union steward present. Section 9 of the NLRA requires the union to be 
the exclusive representative of the employees only "for the purposes of collective 
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi- 
tions of employment." 29 U.S.C. $ 159(a) (1988). Therefore, as long as the private 
employer/employee conference over reasonable accommodation does not patently 
involve "terms and conditions" of employment, such as an employee's request for a 
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and difficult problems disabled persons face, disabled employ- 
ees in a unionized setting will often be justified in pursuing the 
direct contact with their employers that is encouraged under 
the ADA. 
Moreover, it  should be noted that union personnel desig- 
nated under section 9 of the NLRA to be the employees' repre- 
sentatives may not be the actual representative choice of all, or 
even a majority of, the bargaining unit employees.55 In the 
event a union fails to fairly represent an employee, it commits 
a n  unfair labor practice and faces possible sanctions.56 Such 
sanctions, however, do not effectively protect the individual 
rights to which a disabled employee is entitled under the ADA. 
Since disabled employees might not be fairly represented by a 
union,5' the ADA is necessary to provide an appropriate meth- 
od of redress for all disabled individuals who suffer the conse- 
quences of arbitrary management decisions.58 
b. Confidentiality requirements of the ADA. A related 
potential conflict between the NLFU and the ADA concerns 
issues of privacy. I t  is well established under the NLRA that 
an  employer need not disclose any or all information that a 
union asserts is necessary to process a grievance; the privacy 
rights of employees may override union interests in arguably 
obtaining relevant i n f o r m a t i ~ n . ~ ~  The issue under the ADA is 
wheelchair ramp to enter and exit the building or a wheelchair-accessible bathroom 
stall, it would not violate the exclusive representation principle of the NLRA. On 
the other hand, if the private conference involves negotiating a reasonable accom- 
modation that will clearly affect the "terms and conditions" of employment for all 
union employees in the workplace, see discussion infra part V, then a union repre- 
sentative would clearly have to be present. 
55. As a general rule, a union may be certified in an election if it gets a ma- 
jority of the votes cast. Thus, since a union may be designated by a majority of 
valid ballots, the union might in fact only represent a minority of the employees if 
only a small proportion of eligible voters participate. COX ET AL., supm note 53, at  
116. 
56. Sections 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA impose a "duty of fair representa- 
tion" on the union. 29 U.S.C. $ 158(b)(2)-(3) (1988). If a union violates its duty of 
fair representation by discriminating on the basis of race or sex, the National La- 
bor Relations Board (NLRB) may revoke the union's certification. COX ET AL., supra 
note 53, at  1044. 
57. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text. 
58. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 
50, 70 (1975) (When union and employer are not responsive to their legal obliga- 
tions, the bargain they have struck must yield pro tanto to the law, whether by 
means of conciliation through the offices of the EEOC, or by means of federal-court 
enforcement a t  the instance of either that agency or the party claiming to be ag- 
grieved."). 
59. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318-19 (1979) (holding that an 
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whether the sensitive medical and health histories of employ- 
ees will be accessible t o  unions. The ADA's "confidentiality" 
provision states: 
A covered entity may require a medical examination after an 
offer of employment has been made to a job applicant and 
prior to the commencement of the employment duties of such 
applicant, and may condition an offer of employment on the 
results of such examination, if- 
(A) all entering employees are subjected to such an ex- 
amination regardless of disability; 
(B) information obtained regarding the medical condition 
or history of the applicant is collected and maintained on 
separate forms and in separate medical files and is 
treated as  a confidential medical record, except that- 
(i) supervisors and managers may be informed 
regarding necessary restrictions on the work or du- 
ties of the employee and necessary accommoda- 
tions . . . .60 
Union representatives can participate in "reasonable ac- 
commodation conferences" without violating this provision for 
two reasons. First, it  should be emphasized that this provision 
applies only to the results of employee medical examinations. 
Many disabled individuals may be entitled to reasonable ac- 
commodation and an employer conference regarding such ac- 
commodation even though their disability does not involve a 
medical ~ondition.~' 
Second, an analysis of NLRA definitions leads one to the 
conclusion that unions should have access to examination re- 
cords. The ADA provides that, although medical information is 
to be confidential, supervisorss2 and managers are entitled to 
employer was not required to disclose the results of employee aptitude test scores 
to the union without employee consent because the testing information was of a 
"sensitive nature" and the "burden on the Union . . . [was] minimal"). 
60. 42 U.S.C. 4 12112(3) (Supp. I1 1990). 
61. For example, learning disabilities and other psychological disorders are 
included in the definition of "disability." 29 C.F.R. 8 1630.2(g) (1992). While most 
laypersons view the ADA as providing " 'wheelchair ramps and braille stickers on 
elevators, . . . statistically the largest number of people the ADA will affect will be 
the learning disabled.' " Elaine Jarvik, Learning Disorders Make Life Puzzling and 
Heartbreaking, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 6, 1992, at C1 (quoting Michael Herbert, di- 
rector of the Research Assessment Center, University of Utah). 
62. According to the NLRA, the term "supervisor" means 
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, 
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or 
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be informed about an employee's medical status." Since su- 
pervisors are representatives of upper management, it follows 
that supervisors will frequently exercise "independent judg- 
ment" and participate directly in ADA "conferences" with dis- 
abled individuals to determine what reasonable accommodation 
needs to be made. Thus, it would be inconsistent for the ADA 
to grant supervisors access to a disabled person's medical re- 
cords but exclude union representatives from "reasonable ac- 
commodation" conferences with supervisors during which such 
records frequently will be discussed. In addition, it must be 
noted that supervisors and managers are the ones to whom 
unionized employees usually bring their  grievance^.^^ Unions 
may be entitled to employee medical records in order to proper- 
ly process a grievance with or against the ~upe rv i so r .~~  
2. Mandatory subjects of bargaining 
In addition to dovetailing with the NLRA on the issue of 
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust 
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in c o ~ e d i o n  
with the foregoing the exercise of authority is not of a merely routine or 
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. 
29 U.S.C. 9 152(11) (1988) (emphasis added). 
63. 42 U.S.C. 3 12112(3)(B)(i) (Supp. I1 1990). 
64. See David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargainiqj Agree- 
ment, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663, 743 (1973) ("The grievance procedure normally consists 
of steps. First, the aggrieved employee, or the union, raises the problem with the 
immediate supervisor."). 
65. I t  may be difficult for unions to gain access to individual medical exami- 
nation records of employees on the grounds that the NLRB has recognized that 
"employers may have a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting the confi- 
dentiality of employees' medical records." Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local 
Union No. 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing Johns- 
Manville Sales Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. 368, 368 (1980)). However, since Detroit Edison, 
440 U.S. a t  318-19, requires the NLRB and courts to weigh the union's interest in 
relevant information against an employer's legitimate interest in maintaining the 
confidentiality of such information, it is conceivable that employers will at  times be 
required to divulge medical information otherwise confidential under the ADA. This 
is particularly true in the case of reassignment, where the union's attempts to 
enforce seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement may be frustrated 
if an employer suddenly transfers a newly hired disabled employee to "light duty 
work." See discussion supra part V. Without an opportunity to examine and chal- 
lenge the medical condition of the employee (to verify a t  a minimum whether he 
has met the physical criteria for such a transfer), unions may find their efforts to 
uphold collective bargaining agreement provisions governing "light duty" reassign- 
ment to be undermined. In short, the union's interest in preserving intact seniority 
provisions and other "terms and conditions" of employment present in the collective 
bargaining agreement may be weighed more heavily than an employer's interest in 
preserving confidentiality under the ADA. 
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exclusive representation, the ADA also reinforces the process of 
collective bargaining itself. A key provision of the NLRA de- 
fines collective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual 
obligation of the employer and the representative of the em- 
ployees to meet a t  reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
empl~yment."~"f one views the NLRA's purpose as one of fur- 
thering collective employee participation, it is natural to inter- 
pret the NLRA's "terms and conditions of employment" lan- 
guage broadly. Thus, virtually every matter which has an im- 
pact on the terms and conditions of employment becomes a 
matter over which the employer must bargain c~llectively.~~ 
The ADA encourages collective bargaining by prohibiting 
discrimination against a qualified individual with a disabili- 
ty-a disabled person capable of performing a job's essential 
functions. Since "essential functions" are defined by EEOC 
regulations as "the fundamental job duties of the employment 
position the individual with a disability holds or desires,"68 
unions will surely insist on negotiating over what these "funda- 
mental duties" entail.69 Since a determination of what job 
functions are essential may have a direct impact on whether a 
disabled employee has a job a t  all," the ADA appears to make 
collective bargaining on this issue a crucial requirement. More- 
over, because the ADA lists reassignment as a potential reason- 
able accommodation for a qualified individual with a disabili- 
ty7'-an accommodation which may adversely affect other 
66. 29 U.S.C. 8 158(d) (1988). 
67. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 221 (1964) (Stewart, 
J., concurring). 
68. 29 C.F.R. 8 1630.2(n) (1992). The regulations also state that the term "es- 
sential functions" does not include the "marginal hnctions" of a position. Id. 
69. See Feller, supm note 64, at 738 (stating that collective bargaining 
agreements may contain "provisions specifying the kind of work which different 
classes of employees shall perform"). 
70. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at  222; see also Davis v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 447, 
453-54 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that a deaf employee established a prima facie case 
of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act in part because the Postal Service's 
Qualification Standards for Bargaining Unit Positions were overbroad and because 
the applicable standard requiring that the time and attendance clerk be able "to 
hear the conversational voice, hearing aid permitted" was not a "business necessi- 
ty"); Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418, 1425-26 (D. Conn. 1987) (holding that an 
employee suffering from achondroplastic dwarfism was not qualified for a distribu- 
tion clerk position because his short stature and limited reach rendered him unable 
to do many of the tasks required in the position). 
71. 42 U.S.C. 8 12112(9) (Supp. I1 1990). 
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unionized e m p l ~ ~ e e s ~ ~ - t h e  ADA appears to actively promote 
collective bargaining, since reassignment policies have long 
been recognized as  subjects of compulsory collective 
bargaining. 73 
B. The ADA and the NLRA Policy Favoring Arbitration 
The potential conflicts between the ADA and the NLRA are 
not limited to  questions of exclusive representation and collec- 
tive bargaining. An apparent inconsistency also exists between 
the ADA's provision allowing a disabled person to bring a pri- 
vate cause of action against an employer and the NLRA's policy 
of promoting arbitration. 
1. The Steelworkers Trilogy 
Perhaps the most frequently cited cases involving federal 
labor policy are known as the "Steelworkers Tril~gy.'"~ The 
Supreme Court's opinions in the three cases, decided on the 
same day, elevated arbitration to a preeminent role in the 
resolution of labor disputes. The Court first held that federal 
courts should not consider the merits of an employee's claim as 
long as  the employee has some claim that is susceptible t o  the 
grievance arbitration procedure.75 In other words, if any 
doubts exist as to whether a particular employee grievance is 
arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement, those 
doubts "should be resolved in favor of ~overage."'~ 
Most importantly, the Court held that federal courts 
should take a "hands off" approach to the decisions of labor 
arbitrators; an arbitrator's decision should stand as long as "it 
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement."77 
72. See infra note 137. 
73. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at  224. 
74. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US. 
593 (1960). 
75. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568. The Court stated that the courts 
have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering wheth- 
er there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is 
particular language in the written instrument which will support the 
claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to  arbitration, not mere- . 
ly those which the court will deem meritorious. 
Id. 
76. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at  583. 
77. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at  597. "The refusal of courts to review the 
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Thus, the trilogy heartily endorsed collective bargaining's griev- 
ance arbitration process. 
2. ADA endorsement of arbitration 
The Americans with Disabilities Act arguably gives a ring- 
ing endorsement of its own to collective bargaining and estab- 
lished policies encouraging arbitration. The fact that the ADA 
explicitly recognizes the significance of collective bargaining 
agreements in the workplace indicates that the ADA implicitly 
recognizes arbitration as the standard procedure that should be 
used to  enforce the agreements. Indeed, the suggestion in a 
Senate report that future collective bargaining agreements 
"contain a provision permitting the employer t o  take all actions 
necessary" to comply with the ADA7' indicates a congressional 
preference for unions and employers to  incorporate the ADA's 
provisions into bargaining agreements and to  interpret these 
provisions by means of grievance arbitration. 
Moreover, "where appropriate and to the extent authorized 
by law" the ADA explicitly encourages the use of alternative 
means of dispute resolution "including settlement negotiations, 
conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact finding, mini-trials, 
and arbitration."" Such a stance is consistent with federal 
labor policy stating that the grievance procedure is an integral 
part of the continuing collective bargaining proce~s.'~ 
However, since the ADA is civil rights legislation, it could 
fail to endorse arbitration and still not undermine established 
principles of grievance resolution that have arisen under the 
NLRA scheme.s1 When considering the roots of arbitration, it 
merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collec- 
tive bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitra- 
tion would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards." 
Id. at 596. 
78. Murphy, supra note 4, at  1618 n.75 (citing S. REP. NO. 116, lOlst Cong., 
1st Sess. 32 (1989)). 
79. 42 U.S.C. $ 12212 (Supp. I1 1990). 
80. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at  578 ("Arbitration of labor disputes under col- 
lective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining pro- 
cess itself."). 
81. Provisions governing grievance procedure, while not mandated by the 
NLRA, now appear in collective bargaining agreements as a matter of course. One 
study conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1961-62 examined all collec- 
tive agreements covering 1000 or more workers in effect at the time, excepting 
railroad, airline, and government agreements. Of these, only 20 agreements, cover- 
ing some 50,000 workers, or slightly more than one-half of one percent, contained 
no grievance procedure. Feller, supra note 64, a t  742 n.350. 
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is important to remember that arbitration clauses (requiring 
grievance arbitration) in collective bargaining agreements are 
not the result of management's good will. While arbitration 
clauses may provide labor and management with a mechanism 
for resolving employee disputes, they typically are agreed upon 
because labor and management make a deal, not out of pure 
concern for employees. I t  is often stated that the arbitration 
clause is the quid pro quo for a no-strike clause.82 Therefore, 
arbitration might be viewed as a means of reducing the costs to 
employers through strike avoidance rather than a means of ad- 
dressing the rights of individual  employee^.^^ 
Furthermore, the mere inclusion of an "ADA compli- 
a n ~ e " ~ ~  clause or other nondiscrimination clause in a collective 
bargaining agreement will not foreclose a disabled employee 
from bringing suit under the ADA as the following section 
demonstrates. 
3. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 
In a landmark labor case, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
CO.,'~ Alexander, a black employee, filed a grievance under 
the collective bargaining agreement governing his workplace 
after he was discharged by the company. In addition to a broad 
arbitration clause, the agreement contained two important 
provisions: one provided that the employer retained the right to 
discharge employees for cause, and the other broadly prohibited 
discrirninati~n.~~ 
82. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 55 (1974) (citing Boys Mar- 
kets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970)). 
83. Id. a t  54-55. The AZexader Court noted: 
The primary incentive for an employer to enter into an arbitration agree- 
ment is the union's reciprocal promise not to strike . . . . It is not unrea- 
sonable to assume that most employers will regard the benefits derived 
from a no-strike pledge as outweighing whatever costs may result fmm 
according employees an arbitral remedy against discrimination in addition 
to their judicial remedy under Title VII. Indeed, the severe consequences 
of a strike may make an arbitration clause almost essential from both the 
employees' and the employer's perspective. 
Id. 
84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
85. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
86. Id. a t  39. The anti-discrimination clause stated that "there shall be no 
discrimination against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex, nation- 
al origin, or ancestry." Id. 
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After the company rejected Alexander's claims that he was 
discharged because of racial discrimination, the grievance was 
submitted to arbitrati~n. '~ However, before an arbitration 
hearing took place, Alexander "filed a charge of racial discrimi- 
nation with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which [sub- 
sequently] referred the complaint to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commi~sion."'~ Soon thereafter, Alexander raised 
his discrimination claim before an arbitrator. However, the 
arbitrator ruled adversely, finding that Alexander had been 
"discharged for just cause."89 The EEOC also issued an unfa- 
vorable ruling, finding that "there was not reasonable cause to 
believe that a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 . . . had occurred."g0 
Alexander then filed suit in federal court, claiming anew 
that he had been the victim of a racially discriminatory em- 
ployment practice in violation of section 703(a)(1) of the Civil 
Rights Act.g1 Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit 
held that since he had chosen to pursue his grievance to final 
arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective 
bargaining agreement, Alexander was bound by the arbitrator's 
decision and was therefore barred from suing his employer 
under Title VII.g"owever, the Supreme Court reversed, 
holdmg that "the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor 
disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employ- 
ment practices can best be accommodated by permitting a n  
employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance- 
arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his 
cause of action under Title VII."93 
a. Civil rights suits address the collective needs of employ- 
ees. The Court's reasoning sheds much light on the ADA and its 
relationship with federal labor policy. First, the Court noted 
that the private right of action available to an  employee under 
Title VII is essential because a private person's suit "not only 
redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important con- 
gressional policy against discriminatory employment 
87. Id. at 42. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. In ruling against the employee, the arbitrator did not comment on the 
employee's claim of racial discrimination. 
90. Id. at 43. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added). 
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 practice^."^ By providing for a private cause of action, both 
Title VII and the ADA serve as mechanisms by which individ- 
ual employees can improve the lot of their co-workers. Thus, 
civil rights legislation, including such acts as Title VII and the 
ADA, actually promotes the collective voice of employees in a 
manner similar to the NLRA. 
b. Contractual rights are different from statutory 
rights. The Alexander Court also distinguished grievance 
arbitration, which employees use to vindicate contractual rights 
under a collective bargaining agreement, from a lawsuit filed 
under Title VII, which employees use to assert independent 
statutory rights." Reasoning that contractual and statutory 
rights remain separate even though an employee alleges that 
both were violated as the result of one factual occurrence, the 
Court stated that "no inconsistency results from permitting 
both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate 
forums.'""n fact, "the relationship between the forums is 
complementary since consideration of the claim by both forums 
may promote the policies underlying each."97 
The same reasoning is applicable to the ADA.g8 The 
ADA's statement of findings makes i t  evident that Congress 
passed the Act because existing laws did not adequately protect 
the rights of disabled Americans." While the ADA targets dis- 
crimination against the disabled in all sectors of the communi- 
ty, not just in the unionized workplace, it  is arguable that part 
94. Id. at 45 (citations omitted). 
95. Id. at 49-50. 
96. Id. at 50. 
97. Id. at 50-51. 
98. I t  has been noted that the ADA contains the same broad coverage of Title 
VII and refers to Title VII in its enforcement provisions. Renee L. Cyr, Note, T h  
Americans with Disabilities Act: Implications for Job Reassignment and the Treat- 
ment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1237, 1258 (1992); see also 
Smith, supra note 38, at 12 (pointing out that the ADA, like $ 504 of the Reha- 
bilitation Act, adopts all of the remedies available under Title VII). The relevant 
provision of the ADA states: 
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 
2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, 
remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to 
the Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the 
basis of disability in violation of any provision of this chapter, or regula- 
tions promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning employ- 
ment. 
42 U.S.C. $ 12117(a) (Supp. I1 1990). 
99. 42 U.S.C. 5 12101(a) (Supp. II 1990). 
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of the reason Congress found it  necessary "to provide clear, 
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimi- 
nation against individuals with di~abilities"'~~ was that the 
grievances of disabled employees were not being properly ad- 
dressed through arbitration pro~edures.'~' 
c. Civil rights statutes do not preempt federal labor 
law. While it was intended to provide additional remedies for 
the disabled, the ADA does not preempt the NLRA.'" The 
ADA, like Title VII, was not designed to prohibit arbitration as 
an effective avenue of redress for employees who suffer discrim- 
ination.lo3 Both the NLRA policy favoring arbitration and the 
100. Id. $ 12101@)(2). The Act's findings also indicate congressional recognition 
that the collective voice of disabled Americans was not being heard: 
[Ilndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who 
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political 
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the 
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not 
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate 
in, and contribute to, society. 
Id. § 12101(a)(7). If unions as the collective voice for labor had been advocating 
appropriately for disabled employees, the "political powerlessnessn of the disabled 
might have been mitigated. 
101. See Fried, supra note 46, at  1028 (noting that by enacting FLSA, OSHA, 
ERISA, and Title VII, "[wle have indeed moved toward a system that recognizes 
individual workers' rights independent of labor-union bargaining"). 
102. As one author commented, the argument that the ADA preempts the NLRA 
focuses on 4 501 of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. $ 12201(a)-(b) (Supp. I1 1990), which 
preempts federal laws that provide lesser protection to disabled individuals than 
the ADA. Smith, supra note 38, at 45. Smith relies on language in a House Report 
on the ADA to support his conclusion that the preemption argument fails. "This 
section (501) explains the relationship between section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 and this Act and the relationship between this Act and State laws that 
provide greater protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities . . . ." H.R. 
REP. NO. 485(I), lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
288-89. Because the NLRA does not provide any specific protection to the disabled 
as a class, it was not one of the acts Congress intended the ADA to preempt as 
providing lesser protections than the ADA. Smith, supra note 38, at 45-46. 
103. Employers concerned about the possibility of "dual remediesn should be 
directed to the opinion in AZexander, where the Court addressed the issue in the 
context of a Title VII dispute. Concluding that an employee is entitled to pursue 
both a Title VII suit and arbitration, the Court reasoned: 
Nor can it be maintained that election of remedies is required by the 
possibility of unjust enrichment through duplicative recoveries. Where, as 
here, the employer has prevailed at arbitration, there, of course, can be 
no duplicative recovery. But even in cases where the employee has first 
prevailed, judicial relief can be structured to avoid such windfall gains. 
Furthermore, if the relief obtained by the employee a t  arbitration were 
fully equivalent to that obtainable under Title VII, there would be no 
further relief for the court to grant and hence no need for the employee 
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ADA's provisions for civil suit are fundamental components of 
a n  overall strategy aimed a t  eliminating discrimination against 
the disabled. 
d. Limitations on arbitrators necessitate private causes of 
action under the ADA. Finally, while the Alexander Court rec- 
ognized that arbitration may be an  appropriate and effective 
avenue for resolving discrimination claims,'" it also noted 
that arbitration is in many respects inferior to federal courts as 
a forum for adjudicating Title VII rights.'05 Arbitration may 
be a n  inappropriate forum because the arbitrator's primary role 
is to enforce the contractual rights of the parties, not to enforce 
the requirements of civil rights legislation.lo6 In addition, ar- 
bitrators are typically conversant with the 'law of the shop, not 
the law of the land,"lo7 while federal courts are designated to 
resolve constitutional and statutory issues.'08 
This same reasoning explains why disabled employees 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement must be able to 
bring civil suits under the ADA. Under the best scenario, un- 
ions and management will incorporate the ADA's nondiscrimi- 
nation provisions into collective bargaining agreements and use 
the grievance arbitration process to provide appropriate redress 
for complaints arising under the agreements. However, since 
the possibility remains that disabled employees will occasional- 
ly be denied appropriate relief in arbitration,'" they must be 
to institute suit. 
Alexundw, 415 U.S. at 51 11.14 (citations omitted). 
104. The Court reasoned: 
[Tlhe grievance-arbitration machinery of the collective-bargaining agree- 
ment remains a relatively inexpensive and expeditious means for resolving 
a wide range of disputes, including claims of discriminatory employment 
practices. Where the collective-bargaining agreement contains a nondis- 
crimination clause similar to Title VII, and where arbitral procedures are 
fair and regular, arbitration may well produce a settlement satisfactory to 
both employer and employee. 
Id. at 55. 
105. Id. at 56. 
106. Id. at 56-57. 
107. Id. at 57 (citing United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga- 
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960)). 
108. Id. 
109. Discussing the potential inadequacies of the arbitration process in resolving 
Title VII claims, the AL~xander Court stated: 
A further concern is the union's exclusive control over the manner and 
extent to which an individual grievance is presented. In arbitration, as in 
the collective-bargaining process, the interests of the individual employee 
may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the 
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allowed to seek judxial remedies. 
IV. THE ADA AND THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT 
Another act embodying important federal labor policy is 
the Railway Labor Act (RLA).l10 The RLA, enacted to address 
the rights of individuals employed by carriers, is similar to the 
NLRA in that it gives employees the right to organize and 
bargain collectively; in addition, the RLA establishes proce- 
dures for grievance arbitration. l1 However, the arbitration 
procedure under the RLA raises some perplexing preemption 
issues when i t  is examined together with the ADA. This section 
explores potential conflicts between the ADA and the RLA and 
suggests that the RLA, like the NLRA, can coexist harmonious- 
ly with the ADA. 
A. Grievance Arbitration Under the RLA 
The primary purpose of the RLA is to provide an orderly, 
peaceful method by which labor and management can resolve 
labor  dispute^."^ This process requires "minor disputes" to be 
initially submitted to grievance procedures that are contractu- 
ally agreed upon by the parties.ll3 Courts have interpreted 
"minor dispute" to mean any dispute between employees and 
carriers arising out of "the interpretation or application of [a] 
collective bargaining agreement ."I l4 
bargaining unit. Moreover, harmony of interest between the union and the 
individual employee cannot always be presumed, especially where a claim 
of racial discrimination is made. And a breach of the union's duty of fair 
representation may prove difficult to establish. 
Id. at 58 n.19 (citations omitted). 
110. 45 U.S.C. $$ 151-188 (1988). 
111. Id. $3 152-153. 
112. Part of the RLA's purpose is to 
provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning 
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; [and] . . . to provide for the 
prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances 
or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of 
pay, rules, or working conditions. 
Id. $ 151(a)(4)-(5). 
113. Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094, 1096 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991) 
("Disputes 'growing out of grievances, or out of interpretation or application of 
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions' must be resolved 
through grievance procedures provided for in collective-bargaining agreement[s]." 
(quoting 45 U.S.C. $ 184 (1988))). 
114. , Id.; see also Stephens v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 792 F.2d 576, 580 (6th Cir. 
1986) (quoting Kaschak v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 707 F.2d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 
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If a minor dispute remains unresolved following grievance 
procedures, the RLA requires the parties to submit to binding 
arbitration before the National Railway Adjustment Board 
(NRAB)' l5 or a privately established arbitration panel. l6 
Courts have been strict in requiring adherence to this process. 
Failure to submit to grievance procedures or the NRAB results 
in  the dismissal of an  employee's or carrier's suit brought di- 
rectly in federal court.ll7 Thus, the RLA arguably encourages 
arbitration even more vigorously does than the NLRA. The 
potential conflict this RLA policy poses with the ADA (and 
other civil rights statutes) is significant; nevertheless, the po- 
tential conflict is capable of resolution because the Supreme 
Court has clearly marked the path. 
B. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Buell 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of RLA preemp- 
tion in the landmark case of Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Railway u. Buell.l18 In Buell, Buell filed a complaint in fed- 
eral court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 
which enables railroad workers to sue their employers for per- 
sonal injuries received from employers or c o - w ~ r k e r s . ~ ~ ~  The 
complaint alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the 
railroad's failure to protect Buell from malicious and oppressive 
harassment from his fellow employees, Buell suffered an emo- 
tional breakdown. lZ0 
Not surprisingly, the railroad asserted that Buell's sole 
remedy was binding arbitration before the National Railroad 
Adjustment Board as required by the RLA.121 The Court re- 
jected this argument, holding that regardless of the strong RLA 
policy favoring arbitration, Buell was not barred from bringing 
a n  FELA action for damages? The Buell Court's reasoning 
1983)), amended, 811 F.2d 286 (1987). 
115. The Adjustment Board consists of 34 members, 17 selected by carriers and 
17 selected by recognized labor organizations of employees. 45 U.S.C. $ 153 First 
(1988). 
116. Stephens, 792 F.2d a t  580 (citation omitted); see also Consolidated Rail 
Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989) (holding that an 
adjustment board created under the R I A  has exclusive jurisdiction over minor 
disputes). 
117. Stephens, 792 F.2d at  580 n.6. 
118. 480 US. 557 (1987). 
119. Id. at 559. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 564. The Court reasoned: 
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is relevant in two aspects to the relationship between the ADA 
and the RLA. 
I .  The ADA created federal statutory rights for individuals 
Most important is the Court's statement that the federal 
labor policy promoting arbitration cannot preempt a n  
employee's private cause of action brought under a federal stat- 
ute enacted to create substantive rights for ind i~ idua ls . '~~  
This reasoning tends to support the argument that the RLA 
and other federal labor acts do not preempt the ADA. Clearly, 
the ADA is a federal statute designed to "provide minimum 
substantive guarantees to individual  worker^."'^^ 
Yet this reasoning can also be problematic, for preemption 
arguably does not depend on whether the employee's suit is 
brought under a federal or state statute,'" but on whether the 
The fad  that an injury otherwise compensable under the FELA was 
caused by conduct that may have been subject to arbitration under the 
RLA does' not deprive an employee of his opportunity to bring an FELA 
action for damages. Presumably a host of personal injuries suffered by 
railroad employees are caused by negligent practices and conditions that 
might have been cured or avoided by the timely invocation of the griev- 
ance machinery. But we have never considered that possibility a bar to 
an employee's bringing an FELA claim for personal injuries, and the 
Railroad has not persuaded us to do so now. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
123. The opinion's key language reads: 
This Court has, on numerous occasions, declined to hold that individu- 
al employees are, because of the availability of arbitration, barred from 
bringing claims under federal statutes. See, e.g., McDonald v. West 
Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 
Inc., 450 US. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 
(1974). Although the analysis of the question under each statute is quite 
distinct, the theory running through these cases is that notwithstanding 
the strong policies encouraging arbitration, "different considerations apply 
where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute 
designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual work- 
ers." Barrentine, supra, at 737. 
Buell, 480 U.S. at  564-65. 
124. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981). 
125. Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit has held that the RLA preempts state civil 
rights acts, thus barring an employee from bypassing RLA arbitration procedures 
and bringing suit directly against the employer. In McCall v. Chesapeake & Ohio 
Ry., 844 F.2d 294 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 879 (1988), the court held that 
the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act was preempted by the RLA. Distin- 
guishing Buell, the court stated: 
Although Bud1 stands for the proposition that claims under substan- 
tive statutory rights may be decided outside of the labor arbitration ma- 
chinery, it should not be read . . . to dictate a holding in this case that 
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the dispute can be resolved independently of the collective 
bargaining agreement. Several courts have held that  state civil 
rights statutes barring employment discrimination are pre- 
empted by the RLA, reasoning that when an RLA arbitration 
board "is required by the collective bargaining agreement to 
make the same factual inquiry regarding physical ability to 
perform a job as would be made under the state act, the federal 
dispute resolution process is the sole remedy."126 
Because the ADA is a federal law, federal case law like 
Buell will likely control interpretation of the ADA. Yet these 
state cases still portend cloudy horizons for the ADA. Since the 
ADA's regulations stipulate that the terms of a collective bar- 
gaining agreement may be considered in determining whether 
an  employer is required to make a particular accommoda- 
tion,'" employers conceivably will often insist that the agree- 
ment is determinative and therefore that arbitration is the 
exclusive forum for resolving claims arising under the ADA. In 
other words, employers may attempt to avoid suit under the 
ADA by arguing that a determination of the validity of an 
employee's claims requires analysis of the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement.lZ8 If courts accept these arguments, 
the entire purpose of the ADA will be undermined. 
Nevertheless, courts will hopefully be persuaded by the 
reasoning in Buell and similar cases arising under the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA)lZg and recognize that the 
the state act is preempted. FELA, the statute involved in Buell, is a 
federal statute . . . . In the instant case, we are concerned with a state 
statute. The issue is not the relationship between two federal statutes 
passed by Congress; it is the relationship between a federal statute and a 
state statute. 
Id. at 298. 
126. Id. at  303. See also Stephens v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 792 F.2d 576, 580 (6th 
Cir. 1986) ("If the [state] 'action is based on a matrix of facts which are inextrica- 
bly intertwined with the grievance machinery of the collective bargaining agree- 
ment and of the R.L.A.,' exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB preempts the action." 
(citation omitted)); Underwood v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 78, 83 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Although the existence of a relationship between rights regulated 
by the state and the collective bargaining agreement is not in itself enough to 
mandate preemption, the strong similarity between the inquiry that an Adjustment 
Board would have to make and that made by a jury in a state cause of action 
requires that the claim under the [New York Human Rights Law] be preempted in 
this case."). 
127. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra note 126. 
129. While cases arising under the LMRA do not control cases arising under the 
RLA because RLA preemption is broader, Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 
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ADA creates independent rights that deserve protection in 
federal court. By recognizing that collective bargaining agree- 
ments may be relevant when one interprets its various provi- 
sions, the ADA validates the policies of collective bargaining 
F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1991), cases arising under the LMRA are helpful in 
determining when statutory rights are independent enough to arise separately from 
collective bargaining agreements. 
The most important case discussing preemption in the context of the LMRA is 
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). In Lingle, an em- 
ployee was discharged for allegedly filing a false worker's compensation claim. 
Although the employee pursued arbitration and was eventually reinstated with full 
backpay, he also brought a state law tort claim in federal court, alleging that he 
had been discharged in retaliation for exercising his rights under the state 
worker's compensation laws. 
In holding that the employee's state law claim for retaliatory discharge was not 
preempted by $ 301 of the LMRA (because the claim did not require interpretation 
of a collective bargaining agreement), the Court reasoned: 
[Elven if' dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, 
on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing 
precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be 
resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is "indepen- 
dent" of the agreement for $ 301 pre-emption purposes. 
Id. a t  409-10. The Court also relied on its prior reasoning in Buell, stating that 
"there is nothing novel about recognizing that substantive rights in the labor rela- 
tions context can exist without interpreting collective-bargaining agreements." Id. a t  
411. 
Following Lingle, at least two courts have held that an employee's state law 
claim of handicap discrimination is not preempted by the LMRA. See Smolarek v. 
Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir.) (holding that an employee's claim was not 
preempted by LMRA $ 301 because resolution of a handicap discrimination claim 
would not require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 992 (1989); Ackerman v. Western Elec, Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 
1988) (holding that an employee's discrimination claim under the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act was not preempted by LMRA $ 301 because the 
right is "defmed and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of 
any collective bargaining agreement"). 
See also Miller v. AT&T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 1988) (hold- 
ing that an Oregon statute prohibiting discrimination based on physical handicap 
created a "mandatory and independent state right that is not preempted by section 
301"); Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 659 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1987) 
(holding that employee's claim of handicap discrimination under the Texas Commis- 
sion on Human Rights Act was not preempted by the LMRA), afd, 863 F.2d 881 
(5th Cir. 1988); Austin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 644 F. Supp. 763, 767 (D. 
Mass. 1986) (holding that employee's claim of handicap discrimination and wrongful 
discharge was not preempted by LMRA 4 301 because the duty not to discharge 
employees on the basis of handicap arose from state common law, "independent of 
any right established by contract"). 
Cf. Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1991) (hold- 
ing that an employee's claim that her employer violated RICO by paying her dis- 
ability benefits in an amount less than that provided for in the collective bargain- 
ing agreement was preempted by the RLA, employee based her RICO claim "on 
predicate acts that involve[d] violation of a right created by the CBA"). 
1082 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
and arbitration under the RLA just as it does under the NLRA. 
Yet binding arbitration cannot be an exclusive forum for the 
disabled under the RLA any more than it is under the NLRA. 
2. The ADA provides disabled employees with individualized 
remedies 
The other significant point made by the Buell Court is that 
some federal statutes, like FELA, not only provide workers 
with "substantive protection against negligent conduct that is 
independent of the employer's obligations under its collective- 
bargaining agreement, but also afford[] injured workers a reme- 
dy suited to their needs, unlike the limited relief that seems to 
be available through the Adjustment Board."lso Certainly 
Title I of the ADA accomplishes the same goal; its entire thrust 
is to eliminate employment discrimination against the disabled 
by requiring employers to make reasonable accomodations 
suited t o  the individual needs of each disabled empl~yee.'~' 
Thus, when called upon to adjudicate conflicts arising between 
the RLA and the ADA, courts should hold that arbitration 
cannot be the last stop for disabled employees. 
V. REASSIGNMENT AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
Perhaps the best way to understand how the federal labor 
policies discussed will impact the ADA is to examine the issue 
of rea~signrnent, '~~ an issue of substantial concern among 
employers facing compliance with the Act.lS3 This issue is of 
critical importance to employers with a unionized workforce be- 
cause reassignment policies, which are often tied to seniori- 
are usually an integral part of the collective bargaining 
130. Buell, 480 U.S. at  565 (emphasis added). 
131. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
132. The term "reassignment" is generally understood to mean "any transfer of 
an employee from one position to another position, including demotions." Kathryn 
W. Tate, The Federal Employer's Duties Under the Rehabilitation Act: Does Rea- 
sonable Accommodation or AfFrmative Action Include Reassignment?, 67 TEX. L. 
REV. 781, 820 11.209 (1989). 
133. See, eg., Michael J. Lotito & Michael J. Soltis, Prepare for ADA Now, 
INDUS. WEEK, Oct. 7, 1991, at 64; Michael A. Verespej, Here. Comes a New Legal 
Quagmire, INDUS. WEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, at  85. 
134. Set?, eg., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 789 (1st Cir. 1989) (reassignment of 
disabled Postal Service employee was not required when such action would violate 
the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement requiring that as- 
signments must be bid for and then awarded on the basis of seniority); Carter v. 
Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 466 (4th Cir. 1987) (disabled employee denied reassignment 
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agreement. Unfortunately, this issue is clouded with confusion 
because of the ADA's failure to address it squarely.'" This 
section examines how the ADA's provision for reassignment, as 
a possible reasonable accommodation, interacts with federal 
labor policies that favor collective bargaining and arbitration. 
A. Reassignment under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
Several courts have found that reassignment is not a rea- 
2 sonable accommodation required by the Rehabilitation Act 
because an  employee may be fired if she can no longer perform 
the essential functions of the job for which she was hired.ls6 
More importantly, the majority of courts that  have considered 
the issue in a union setting have found that reassignment 
cannot be a required accommodation if it "usurp[s] the legiti- 
mate rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agree- 
ment."13' 
This precedent has the potential to exert strong influence 
over interpretation of the ADA; even though the ADA specifi- 
cally includes reassignment as  a possible accommodation,'" 
Title I of the ADA is modeled after the regulations that imple- 
ment section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.lSg Therefore, if 
- 
because collective bargaining agreement required that an employee serve five years 
before beconiing eligible for a permanent light duty assignment). 
135. One author commented that while the EEOC provides that "employers may 
refer to a collective-bargaining agreement to clarify whether a particular job func- 
tion is essential[,] . . . it left unanswered whether filling job vacancies according to 
collective-bargaining rules violates ADA provisions if those rules would discriminate 
against someone with a disability." Verespej, supra note 133, a t  85. 
136. See, eg . ,  Black v. Frank, 730 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (S.D. Ala. 1990); 
Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 486 (W.D. Tern. 1986), afd, 831 F.2d 298 
(6th Cir. 1987); Alderson v. Postmaster Gen., 598 F. Supp. 49, 55 (W.D. Okla. 
1984). 
137. Florence v. Frank, 774 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 (N.D. Tex. 1991); see also Shea 
v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1989); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th 
Cir. 1987); Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 
1984); Davis v. United States Postal Sew., 675 F. Supp. 225, 235 (M.D. Pa. 1987); 
Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418, 1424 (D. Corn. 1987); Hurst v. United States 
Postal Serv., 653 F. Supp. 259, 261 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 
1181, 1189 (D. Md. 1985); Jasany v. United States Postal Sew., 33 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1115 (N.D. Ohio 1983), affd, 755 F.2d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir. 
1985); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 928 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. 11 1990). 
139. 29 C.F.R. app. $ 1630 (1992). The overview of the regulations states: 
The format of part 1630 reflects congressional intent, as expressed in 
the legislative history, that the regulations implementing the employment 
provisions of the ADA be modeled on the regulations implementing sec- 
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 34 CFR part 104. 
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courts interpret the ADA's requirement of reasonable accommo- 
dation against a backdrop of Rehabilitation Act litigation, they 
might continue to bar reassignment when the terms of a collec- 
tive bargaining agreement prohibit such action. Indeed, when 
one considers the Supreme Court's opinion in Ford Motor Co. u. 
EEOC,l4' the validity of reassignment as a reasonable accom- 
modation seems marginal a t  best. 
B. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC 
In this case, Judy Gaddis applied for a job in 1971 as a 
"picker-packer" at the Ford warehouse in Charlotte, North 
Carolina. At the time she applied, no woman had ever worked 
as  a "picker-packer" in the warehouse.'" Even though she 
was qualified for the position, Ford hired a man, prompting 
Gaddis to file a charge of sexual discrimination with the 
EEOC.142 
In July 1973, another position opened and Ford offered the 
job to Gaddis, but without seniority retroactive to her 1971 
app1i~ation.l~~ Gaddis rejected this offer, partly because she 
did not want to lose the seniority she had accrued working a t  
General Motors in the interim.'" In July 1975, the EEOC 
sued Ford in federal district court, "alleging that Ford had 
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to 
hire women at the Charlotte wareh~use." '~~ 
The district court held, and the court of appeals affirmed, 
that  Ford had discriminated against Gaddis on the basis of her 
sex and that Gaddis was therefore entitled to backpay dating 
from July 1973, when she rejected Ford's unconchtional job 
offer.'46 However, the court of appeals suggested that "had 
Ford promised retroactive seniority with its job offer, the offer 
would have cut off Ford's backpay liability."'47 Without such 
Accordingly, in developing part 1630, the Commission has been guided by 
the section 504 regulations and the case law interpreting those regula- 
tions. 
Id. 
140. 458 US. 219 (1982). 
141. Id. at 221. 
142. Id. at 222. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 223 (citation omitted). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 223-24. 
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an offer, Ford's 1973 offer was "incomplete and unaccept- 
able."148 
Overturning the decision of the court of appeals, the Su- 
preme Court held that "absent special circumstances, the rejec- 
tion of a n  employer's unconditional job offer ends the accrual of 
potential backpay liability."149 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court reasoned that Title VII permits courts to consider the 
rights of "innocent third parties."'" The Court then stated: 
The lower court's rule places a particularly onerous burden on 
the innocent employees of an employer charged with discrimi- 
nation. Under the court's rule, an employer may cap backpay 
liability only by forcing his incumbent employees to yield 
seniority to a person who has not proved, and may never 
prove, unlawful discrimination. As we have acknowledged on 
numerous occasions, seniority plays a central role in allocat- 
ing benefits and burdens among employees. In light of the 
" 'overriding importance' " of these rights, American Tobacco 
Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 76 (1982) (quoting Humphrey v. 
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 346 (1964)), we should be wary of any 
rule that encourages job offers that compel innocent workers 
to sacrifice their seniority to a person who has only claimed, 
but not yet proved, unlawful di~crimination.'~' 
Thus, the Court was unwilling to give Title VII rights super- 
priority over the contractual rights of seniority to which em- 
ployees were entitled under a collective bargaining agree- 
ment. 152 
-- 
148. Id. at 224. 
149. Id. at 241. 
150. Id. at  239 (citing City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 
435 US. 702, 723 (1978)). 
151. Id. at 239-40. In a footnote, the Court commented: 
Id. 
Seniority may govern, " 'not only promotion and layoff, but also transfer, 
demotion, rest days, shift assignments, prerogative in scheduling vacation, 
order of layoff, possibilities of lateral transfer to avoid layoff, 'bumping' 
possibilities in the face of layoff, order of recall, training opportunities, 
working conditions, length of layoff endured without reducing seniority, 
length of layoff recall rights will withstand, overtime opportunities, park- 
ing privileges, and [even] a preferred place in the punch-out line.' " 
at 239 n.28 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 US. 747, 766-67 
(1976)) (emphasis added). 
152. Emphasizing that costs to an employer would be high were retroactive se- 
niority to be granted, the Court stated: 
The rule adopted by the court below . . . makes hiring the Title VII 
claimant more costly than hiring one of the other applicants for the same 
job. To give the claimant retroactive seniority before an adjudication of 
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Because 
ty,lS and 
included"'" 
reassignment policies usually are tied to seniori- 
because seniority provisions are "universally 
in collective bargaining agreements, Ford casts 
substantial doubt on the legality of requiring reassignment as a 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA when reassignment 
impacts seniority. Nevertheless, reassignment should be, and 
is, a legitimate form of reasonable accommodation for disabled 
employees. 
1. A few courts permit reassignment 
First, some courts have held that the Rehabilitation Act 
requires an employer to consider reassignment when a disabled 
employee becomes unable to perform the essential functions of 
the job for which he was hired.ls5 While the employees in 
liability, the employer must be willing to pay the additional costs of the 
fringe benefits that come with the seniority that newly hired workers 
usually do not receive. More important, the employer must also be pre- 
pared to cope with the deterioration in morale, labor unrest, and reduced 
productivity that may be engendered by inserting the claimant into the 
seniority ladder over the heads of the incumbents who have earned their 
places through their work on the job. In many cases, moreover, disruption 
of the existing seniority system will violate a collective-bargaining agree- 
ment, with all that such a violation entails for the employer's labor rela- 
tions. Under the rule adopted by the court below, the employer must be 
willing to accept all these additional costs if he hopes to toll his backpay 
liability by offering the job to the claimant. As a result, the employer will 
be less, rather than more, likely to hire the claimant. 
Id. at 229. 
153. See supra note 134. 
154. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977); see also 
Teamsters Local Union No. 42 v. NLRB, 825 F.2d 608, 613 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding 
that the question of how to order seniority in a new bargaining unit created by 
the consolidation of two preexisting units was a matter for the bargaining table); 
Schick v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 1969) (stating that seniority is "valid 
subject matter for the collective bargaining process"); Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 375 F.2d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 1967) (stating that because seniority has a vital 
impact on "terms and conditions of employment" it is a mandatory subject of bar- 
gaining); NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1967) 
("Seniority rights and layoff practices have been recognized by the courts as falling 
within the broad definition of 'terms and conditions of employment.' " (citation 
omitted)). 
155. Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the 
offer of a staff nurse position to a disabled former head nurse was a permissible 
reasonable accommodation); Coley v. Secretary of Army, 689 F. Supp. 519 (D. Md. 
1987) (holding that the Army had a duty to attempt reassignment of handicapped 
persons prior to  termination, which entailed consideration of the variety of posi- 
tions for which the employee was allegedly qualified); Rhone v. United States Dep't 
of Army, 665 F. Supp. 734, 744 (E.D. Mo. 1987) ("While agencies cannot be expect- 
ed to search ad infiniturn for a position that will correlate with a handicapped 
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these cases were not covered by collective bargaining agree- 
ments, that fact should not bar courts from requiring reassign- 
ment under the ADA; several of the cases rejecting reassign- 
ment in the collective bargaining context have done so because 
the Rehabilitation Act did not explicitly require reassign- 
ment.'" Therefore, the door is open for future courts to inter- 
pret the ADA as requiring more than the Rehabilitation Act. . 
2. Seniority and reassignment policies are mandatory subjects 
of bargaining 
Second, seniority provisions and reassignment policies are 
considered mandatory subjects of bargaining because they 
affect the "terms and conditions of empl~yment." '~~ Therefore, 
these provisions and policies will probably be modified in collec- 
tive bargaining negotiations to reflect ADA policies. I t  should 
be noted that the ADA explicitly prohibits a covered entity from 
using collective bargaining agreements as  an excuse to dis- 
criminate. 
3. Reassignment is not mandatory 
Third, reassignment is not mandatory under the ADA; it is 
only one of several alternatives to be considered by an employ- 
er in determining the appropriate accommodation for a dis- 
abled employee. Not only did Congress place limitations on the 
scope of reas~ignment , '~~ but i t  also recognized that reas- 
employee's remaining abilities and qualifications, . . . federal employers are bound 
to undertake a reasonable and competent. attempt to retain such employees in a 
capacity in which they are qualified and capable of serving."). 
156. Tate, supra note 132, at 833. 
157. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. 
158. According to the Act, the term "discriminate" includes 
participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that 
has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or em- 
ployee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this subchap- 
ter (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or re- 
ferral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an 
employee of a covered entity, or an organization providing training and 
apprenticeship programs). 
42 U.S.C. $ 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added). 
159. The House Education and Labor Report on the ADA stated: 
Reasonable accommodation may also include reassignment to a vacant 
position. If an employee, because of disability, can no longer perform the 
essential hnctions of the job that she or he has held, a transfer to anoth- 
er vacant job for which the person is qualified may prevent the employee 
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signment should be considered only as a last resort.160 As one 
author has noted, "when it would be possible to accommodate 
an  employee by job restructuring or modifying the employee's 
work schedule, such avenues must be pursued before reassign- 
ing the employee to another p~sit ion." '~~ 
4. The ADA recognizes federal labor policy 
Finally, the ADA's recognition of collective bargaining 
agreements as a factor to consider in determining what accom- 
modations the ADA requires implies that substantial limits 
must be placed on reassignment. While employers cannot sim- 
ply ignore the ADA and claim that they are absolutely barred 
from considering reassignment under the collective bargaining 
agreement, individuals suing under the ADA cannot hold to the 
other extreme and claim that reassignment is always mandato- 
ry where available. Nevertheless, reassignment should at least 
be considered. Both federal labor laws and the ADA have im- 
portant roles to play in assuring that reassignment becomes a 
fair and reasonable option among accommodations that may be 
offered to disabled employees. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act marks 
the dawning of a new era of civil rights. No longer forced to 
suffer in silence the harsh discrimination to which they have 
been subjected for decades, disabled Americans are now as- 
sured a permanent and important place in society, particularly 
in the workforce. 
Yet exuberance over the ADA's passage should not be blind 
to the circumstances under which it will operate. Primarily a 
law to end a specific facet of employment discrimination, the 
ADA will necessarily interact with several other laws governing 
employment relationships in the United States. Specifically, 
the ADA will become an integral piece of established federal 
from being out of work and employer from losing a valuable worker . . . . 
The Committee . . . wishes to make clear the reassignment need only be 
to a vacant position-"bumping" another employee out of a position to 
create a vacancy is not required. 
H.R. REP. NO. 485(n[), lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1990), reprinted i n ,  1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 345. 
160. Cyr, supra note 98, at 1255. 
161. Id. (citation omitted). 
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labor policy promoting collective bargaining and arbitration. 
Consequently, courts must interpret the ADA so as to not tram- 
ple the legitimate rights of employees and employers working 
under valid collective bargaining agreements. Labor has come 
too far to be casually brushed aside in the interest of providing 
"reasonable accomodations"; the ADA might never have suc- 
ceeded if labor had not laid the groundwork for learning how to 
restrain management from arbitrary decisions.lB2 
At the same time, courts should recognize that the ADA is 
a law intended to grant disabled persons the maximum protec- 
tion possible. While i t  does not override federal labor policy, at 
the same time it should not take a back seat. Discrimination 
against the disabled is a problem in the union setting just as i t  
is elsewhere. 
This comment suggests that the ADA and federal labor 
laws are in reality two sides of the same coin. Both are de- 
signed to promote the collective voice of employees; both pro- 
vide mechanisms whereby individual employees can petition for 
redress. Finally, both have the capacity to be forceful tools in 
the fight to end discrimination against the disabled. As the 
ADA, the NLRA, and the RLA interact and work together to 
create a better employment atmosphere for the disabled, all 
Americans with disabilities can look to the future with hope 
and anticipation. 
David S. Doty 
162. As John L. Lewis, founder of the Committee for Industrial Organization 
(CIO) said in a famous speech: 
No tin hat brigade of goose-stepping vigilantes or bibble-babbling mob 
of blackguarding and corporation-paid scoundrels will prevent the onward 
march of labor, or divert its purpose to play its natural and rational part 
in the development of the economic, political, and social life of our nation. 
Unionization, as opposed to communism, presupposes the relation of 
employment; it is based upon the wage system, and i t  recognizes fully 
and unreservedly the institution of private property and the right to in- 
vestment profits. It is upon the hller development of collective bargain- 
ing, the wider expansion of the labor movement, the increased influence 
of labor in our national councils, that the perpetuity of our democratic 
institutions must largely depend. 
Labor's John L. Lewis Defends His Union's Right to Strike, in LEND ME YOUR 
EARS: GREAT SPEECHES IN HISTORY, supra note 1, at 585. 
